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Motivation
i. Reverse engineering multiple versions of 
essentially the same binary is oftentimes needed:
i. Security review of sequential versions of the same piece 
of software
ii. Analysis of multiple variants of the same high-level-
language virus
iii. Analysis of security updates (“patches”)
ii. Problem is asymetric:
i. Changing a few lines of sourcecode and recompiling is 
comparatively easy
ii. Reverse engineering is harder: Function names have to 
be recovered, then functions have to be read and the 
change detected
iii. Both HLL-Virus authors and software vendors try to 
exploit this asymetry to their advantage
Structural Comparison
Diff’ing executables is difficult
Why not use something like DIFF ?
i. Small changes in the source code can trigger 
significant changes in the executable:
i. Adding a structure member will change immediate offsets 
for all accesses to structure members behind the new 
member
ii. Adding a few lines of code can produce radically different 
register assignments and lead to differing instructions
iii. Changed sizes of basic blocks in one function can lead to 
code in unrelated functions changing ( because of branch 
inversion ) 
ii. The overwhelming majority of changes in the 
binary are irrelevant 
i. Classical trade-off: More false positives or running the risk 
of a false negative ?
A structural approach
i. Standard source-code “diff”-techniques can’t be 
applied:
i. Register allocation can / will change
ii. Arrangement of basic blocks and branch directions can 
change
iii. Depending on optimization, compilers can decide to use 
different instructions 
(e.g. lea eax, [eax + 10] vs add eax, 10)
ii. Addresses of global symbols change
iii. Filtering unwanted changes requires very CPU-
specific implementation
Î A more general approach is presented in this talk, 
focusing primarily on structural properties of an 
executable
Structural Comparison
Viewing a program as graph of graphs
i. Primarily one is interested in changes to program 
logic
ii. A program can be viewed by looking at two graphs:
i. The callgraph which contains all functions and their 
relationships ( A calls B etc. ) 
ii. The individual function flowgraphs which represent the 
basic blocks of every function and how they are linked by 
conditional or unconditional branches 
iii. The program logic is more or less encoded in 
these two graphs
i. Adding a single if( ) in any function will trigger a change in 
it’s flowgraph
ii. Changing a call to strcpy to a call to strncpy will change the 
callgraph
Structural Comparison
Detecting changes by comparing graphs
i. Program logic is encoded a callgraph with nodes 
being the individual function flowgraphs
ii. Comparing two executable based on these graphs 
will detect logic changes 
iii. The comparison should be false-positive-free:
i. Only “real” changes to program logic should be detected
ii. Compilers don’t usually change the program logic 
iv. The comparison will not be false-negative-free:
i. Switching signedness of a type or changing constants and 
buffer sizes will go undetected
ii. This is neglectable in many cases 
v. So how can two graphs of graphs be compared ?
An executable as 
“Graph of Graphs”
An executable consists of:
which are nodes of a digraph, the callgraph
of an executable ( edges imply calls-to relation )
Every function                       can itself be
viewed as a digraph, the function flowgraph.
Î Executable is a graph of graphs
An executable as 
“Graph of Graphs”
Statically generating a callgraph is not always trivial:
• Calls via function pointers can not be always 
statically resolved
• Calls via OS-dependent functions (e.g. 
CreateThread()) can not always be statically 
resolved
• Calls via indirection through compiler-generated 
structures such as vtables for virtual C++ methods 
can not always be resolved statically 
Luckily, calls that cannot be resolved in one variant of
the binary are unlikely to be resolved in the other
Structural Matching
Consider executables A and B and their
callgraphs:
We want to construct an isomorphism 
In the general case, this isomorphism does not
exist because the cardinalities of the two sets are
not necessarily identical
Iterative construction of 
the partial isomorphism
An initial mapping is created:
This mapping is used to create sequence of 
mappings:
A Simple matching 
heuristic
• Comparing individual flowgraphs initially 
would be too expensive
• Heuristic is used: Every function is 
associated with 3-tuple:
:= Number of basic blocks
:= Number of edges in flowgraph
:= Number of edges originating at
this node in the callgraph
A Simple matching 
heuristic
The initial mapping is created by associating functions 
under the following conditions
• Both functions have the same 3-tuple
• No other functions with the same 3-tuple
exist in both sets
(Additional initial matches can be generated by using 
the names of functions (if available, e.g. in the 
case of dynamically linked functions))
Improving the initial 
mapping (I)
Only a small number of functions will be 
mapped initially.
– Smaller functions are less likely to be mapped 
as the propability for a “collision” of the 
signature increases 
– Smaller subsets to be matched by this heuristic 
will produce better matches as fewer collisions 
occur
Improving the initial 
mapping (II)
Construct better isomorphism      from 
1. Take      and 
2. Let      be the set of all functions that have are 
called by       and       be the set of all functions 
that are called by   
3. Construct                            from      ,       in the 
same way         was constructed from the larger 
sets
4. If                       and a new match was 
constructed,                                    otherwise let
5. and        are the domain and image of 
Practical 
implementation
– Based on IDA Pro as a plugin
– Can deal with x86, MIPS so far
– Additional platforms are normally simple to add 
(exception: Platforms with speculative 
execution)
– PPC and SPARC are planned
– Extra code for attempting to “highlight” changes 
in the graph (very broken heuristics though)
– Additional “heuristic” matches in the 
isomorphism: Treat 3-tuple as coordinates, if 
euclidian distance is smaller than threshold 
attempt to match as well
Practical results
IIS SSL/PCT parser
– Updated schannel.dll
– Information from the security bulletin: 
• Possible remote compromise
• Flaw in PCT parsing (PCT is a legacy protocol 
obsoleted by TLS)
• No technical details about whereabouts etc.
– Only one function with a “PCT” in the name 
changes
Î Change is an added range check to prevent a 
simple stack overflow
Practical results
MSASN1.DLL bugs
– Information from the security bulletin: 
• Integer wrap leading to compromise
• No technical details about whereabouts etc.
– Changes in ASN1DECAlloc, ASN1DecRealloc
– Prevent integer overflows in the allocation 
functions
– Additional changes to prevent memory leaks
Practical results
MSASN1.DLL bugs
– Information from the security bulletin: 
• Integer wrap leading to compromise
• No technical details about whereabouts etc.
– Changes in ASN1DECAlloc, ASN1DecRealloc
– Prevent integer overflows in the allocation 
functions
– Additional changes to prevent memory leaks
Practical results
ISA Server H.323 library bugs
– Information from the security bulletin: 
• Parsing problems in H.323 code
• No technical details about whereabouts etc.
– Added range check before PERDecZero 
CharStringNoAlloc()
– Prevent integer overflows in the allocation 
functions
Î Disclosed unknown vulnerability in NetMeeting 
and H323MSP ! 
Î Publication of the fix did more harm than good
Future improvements
Future improvements on the BinDiff:
– Add functions frame sizes and constant 
arguments of malloc()-calls to the functions 
identification (to detect changed buffer sizes)
– Add static strings as nodes to callgraph for 
improved matching and ambiguity resolution
– Add function flowgrapher to retrieve better 
flowgraphs for speculative execution 
architectures
Future/Related work ?
Treating executables as graphs of graphs opens up 
interesting opportunities:
– Ero Carrera (of F-Secure AV Research team) uses graphs 
of graphs to cluster new HLL virii together to identify “code 
sharing” between virus authors
– Identification of library functions (e.g. OpenSSL) in large 
embedded systems can aid in reverse engineering
– Identification of GPL’ed code fragments in closed-source 
software could be possible
– Identification (or debunking) of code theft claims  ( as in 
the SCO vs Linux case )
Questions ?
